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Abstract
I exploit a change in Spanish regulations that created a quasi-experimental environ-
ment in which to test the effect of entry restrictions on retail gasoline equilibrium prices.
In February 2013, a Central Government reform allowed gasoline stations to operate in
industrial and commercial areas. This deregulation led to a high number of new mar-
ket entrants over the following two years in these newly designated free entry areas. By
isolating markets exposed to entry and markets not affected by new entrants, and using
a difference-in-difference approach, gasoline retail prices are found to fall on average by
at least 1.2% in the free entry areas. This result is economically significant, representing
one fifth of the average retail margin. Moreover, if adopted by every gasoline station, the
price reduction would imply savings in gasoline expenditure alone of around 179 million
euros per year, in the lowest reduction scenario. Additionally, the results show that the
equilibrium price reduction is greatest when the entrant is unbranded and that the effect
decreases with the number of entrants and over time.
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According to the latest statistics published by the European Commission, the transport in-
dustry represents 4.6% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and depends on oil and oil products
for more than 96% of its energy needs. Moreover, by transport mode these statistics show
that, within the EU, 27.75% of passenger transport is made by car and 45% of freight is trans-
ported by road. A comparison with US figures for 2012 shows that the transport industry
represents 2.9% of GDP, while 89.5% of annual long distance trips are made by personal
vehicle and 71.3% of freight is transported by road. In the US, 92% of the countrys energy
needs in the transport sector are met by oil. Clearly, therefore, gasoline continues to be es-
sential for any economic activity and for human life in general. Additionally, gasoline prices
have a great impact on the productivity of firms and family expenditure, not only directly,
but also indirectly as they affect the price of almost every product consumed.
Gasoline retail markets present an oligopoly structure around the world and retail gasoline
prices are a source of constant concern for national governments. For example, retail gasoline
markets have been under investigation by antitrust authorities in several countries, including
in the UK, where the Office of Fair Trading conducted a review of the road fuel sector
to understand the causes of price rises in 2012-2013. In Spain, the National Competition
Commission published a series of reports between 2009 and 2012 expressing concerns about
how Spanish prices and trading margins had increased, placing it toward the top of European
price and margin rankings. In the United States, the Federal Trade Commission recently
conducted an investigation to determine whether increments in retail gasoline prices were
attributable to market manipulation or other anticompetitive behavior. Similarly, various
measures have been introduced to limit control over retail prices in the sector, such as the
divorcement laws in some US states and the recently adopted price regulations in Austria.
Government concerns for the retail gasoline market are reflected in the vast number of
studies undertaken by researchers in the field. In academia, both industry structure and price
behavior have been the focus of economic studies undertaken from a wide range of approaches.
In an attempt at summarizing this literature, Eckert (2013) reviews empirical studies of the
retail gasoline markets and identifies over 75 such articles since 2000.
One line of study in this empirical literature is to analyze the effects of potential reform
measures. Specifically, studies have analyzed the impact of sales below cost regulations, bans
on self-service stations, divorcement laws, and, sales taxes. However, to date, no studies have
examined the effect of entry restrictions nor the impact on the market once they are lifted.
Moreover, while we would expect the lifting of such restrictions to lead to the entry of new
firms into the market, the literature does not report an unequivocal effect of new market
entry on equilibrium prices. Indeed theoretical models predict different outcomes with some
claiming that entry may lower the equilibrium price and others just the reverse.
Relaxing entry restrictions constitutes a potential policy for tackling concerns about gas-
oline prices, however, the effects of such a policy remain unexplored. Indeed, the theoretical
literature fails to provide a clear guide as to what we might expect one the barriers to entry
are removed. In this paper, I seek to fill this gap by empirically analyzing the effect that entry
restrictions have on equilibrium prices. In addressing this question, I use a quasi-experimental
environment created following a change in Spanish regulations in February 2013. The exo-
genous entry decisions due to the change in regulation provided me with this unique data set
to explore the effects of deregulation.
I use a difference-in-difference approach applied to retail prices, demand and supply drivers
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and geographical data for the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona. I test the robustness of my
results for the estimation techniques, different price measures and a heterogeneous response
due to pre-existing differences in the treated and control groups. Additionally, I perform a
placebo test and analyze the dynamic effects of the reform. I report that removing barriers
to entry implies a reduction in retail gasoline price of at least 1.2%. This result is significant,
representing one fifth of the average retail margin, when considering the lowest reduction
scenario. Moreover, if the price reduction were to be adopted by every gasoline station, the
reduction would imply savings in gasoline expenditure alone of more than 179 million euros
per year. The results also show that when an unbranded gasoline station enters the market,
the reduction in the equilibrium price is greater. In this sense, the evidence reported here
supports the early findings of Hastings (2004) and Sen (2005).
A number of related empirical papers have analyzed the effect of market structure on
gasoline retail prices, specifically seeking to determine how the number of competitors in the
market impacts prices. Barron et al. (2004) performed a cross-sectional analysis of the one-
day price in four different areas of the United States to contrast empirically the relationship
between the number of competitors in the market, average price and price dispersion. The
authors found that an increase in the seller density decreases both the average equilibrium
price and price dispersion. In contrast, using a three-year panel of stations located in sub-
urban Washington DC, Hosken et al. (2008) found that the number of competitors in the
market has no influence on price. Finally, Tappata and Yan (2013), analyzed the relationship
between margins and market size with a data set of isolated geographical markets located
near entrances to national parks and, therefore, exposed to demand shocks. The authors used
the past number of visitors to the park to instrument for market size and entry/exit decisions.
Their results show that entry affects equilibrium in a non-monotonic way, leading to a large
price reduction in markets with few incumbents, while the effect diminishes in markets with
more than six or seven firms. I seek to add to this literature by analyzing an external shock
generated by a public policy decision in urban areas. This article does not attempt to shed
light on the relationship between the number of competitors and price, as the first two related
papers, rather its objective is to provide evidence as to how the market responds to an addi-
tional entry. My results are complementary to those of Tappata and Yan (2013), as my data
set let me analyse the effect of an additional entrant in urban areas, rather than in isolated
markets.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first article of its kind to assess the effect on
prices of entry barriers to the retail gasoline market. Similarly, it is one of very few empirical
contributions to the debate concerned with the effect of entry in a differentiated product
market. Therefore, the results reported here are interesting because of their relevance not
only to future gasoline market regulation (or deregulation), but also to a vast number of
sectors that are subject to zoning restrictions, including for example the grocery industry.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. Section 2 conducts the literature review. In
Section 3, the gasoline retail market in Spain is presented. Section 4 reports the identification




This article draws on two related strands of the literature: first, studies that analyze policy
impacts on the structure of the gasoline retail market and its equilibrium prices; and, second,
studies that analyze what happens to the equilibrium price when a firm enters the market.
Policy reforms in the gasoline retail market Gasoline retail market reforms can be
classified into those introduced to protect small retailers from going out of the market and
those aimed at directly controlling retail prices. Among those in the first group, the policy
that has attracted most research attention has been that of sales-below-cost (SBC) regulation.
Among this literature, we found the work of Fenili and Lane (1985), Anderson and Johnson
(1999), Johnson (1999) and Skidmore et al. (2005) for the US gasoline market, and, more
recently, Carranza et al. (2015), analysing Canada.
Gasoline prices have been found both to increase (Fenili and Lane 1985; Anderson and
Johnson 1999)and decrease (Skidmore et al. 2005) following this policy reform. These contra-
dictory outcomes may be due to the different duration of the periods under analysis (Skidmore
et al. 2005), with the policy presenting a differential effect in the short (rise) and long (fall)
terms. As far as market structure is concerned, the studies coincide in showing that the total
number of gasoline outlets increases in the presence of the regulation (Skidmore et al. 2005,
Carranza et al. 2015). Moreover, Carranza et al. (2015) found that after the policy was
introduced, the stations became relatively more homogeneous in terms of the type of services
that they offered, and that the policy caused a long-run decrease in station-level sales.
Another policy established to protect small retailers was analyzed inJohnson and Romeo
(2000), namely, bans on self-service stations. In a study of stations in Oregon and New
Jersey, the authors found that such bans have affected the retail market structure by slowing
down the penetration of convenience store tie-ins, and have resulted in higher retail margins.
Furthermore, the authors also found that the bans provided little protection to smaller outlets,
thus failing to achieve their primary objective.
Among the policies aimed at directly controlling retail prices, Barron and Umbeck (1984)
and Vita (2000) studied the effect of divorcement laws, introduced in the United States,
prohibiting the control of gasoline stations by refiners. Both articles found evidence that
divorcement laws increased gasoline retail prices. Indeed, according to Barron and Umbeck
(1984)BaUm84, the policy resulted in gains for the competitors of the divorced stations, who
raised their prices, resulting in losses for both the affected stations and consumers. As a
side effect of divorcement, the authors reported a reduction in the number of service hours
provided by the affected stations. Finally, Doyle Jr and Samphantharakc (2008) considered
the temporary suspension, and subsequent reinstatement, of the gasoline sales tax in Illinois
and Indiana following a price spike in 2000 to study the effects of sales taxes on retail prices.
Their results coincided with most studies analyzing the way in which shocks to crude oil
prices and wholesale gasoline prices are passed through to retail prices. The authors reported
evidence of asymmetries in the pass-through of reductions and increments in taxes to retail
gasoline prices. Thus, their results suggested that 70% of the tax reduction was passed on to
consumers in the form of lower prices, while between 80 and 100% of the tax reinstatements
were passed on to consumers.
To sum up, the literature has analyzed the effect on gasoline retail prices of sales taxes,
divorcement laws, sales-below-cost regulations and bans on self-service stations. Overall, the
results show that policy reforms often fail to achieve their expected goals.
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Expected effect on prices of deregulation The theoretical literature fails to reach a
consensus on whether the effect of a new entrant in a differentiated product market is to
lower or raise the average equilibrium price.
Despite the common belief that it should lower the equilibrium price, in markets with
differentiated products there are several theoretical papers that conclude just the opposite.
The explanations for this price rise are various. For example, Satterthwaite (1979), Stiglitz
(1987) and Schulz and Stahl (1996), found that an increment in the number of firms causes an
increment in equilibrium price when consumers face search costs. Specifically, Satterthwaite
(1979) found this outcome for reputation goods, while in the model developed by Schulz and
Stahl (1996), prices increase with the number of firms due to the existence of economies of
scope in the search. Rosenthal (1980) found that the same outcome can also be due to the
inability of sellers to charge different prices to different buyers, that is, those over whom they
have market power and those over whom they do not.
Likewise, more than one paper has reported mixed results. In this stand of the literature,
results seem to vary mostly because of consumer preferences. For example, Salop (1979)’s
model of spatial competition with an outside good typically results in a new entrant lowering
the equilibrium price. However, the author also found demand curves to be kinked and when
market equilibrium lies at the kink of the demand curve, increases in market size lead to
price rises. Applying the spokes model of non-localized competition, Chen and Riorda (2007)
showed that an increase in the number of firms reduces the price if consumers value products
highly, but raises the price if consumer value is in an intermediate range. Finally, for Janssen
and Moraga-González (2004), the outcome does not depend solely on consumer search intens-
ity but also on the number of incumbents in the market. The authors examined an oligopoly
model in a costly sequential search to discover price settings, finding that when consumers
search with high intensity, an entry reduces the price when the number of competitors in the
market is low, but raises the price when the number of competitors is high.
Finally, a number of theoretical papers, most notably Gabszewicz and Thisse (1980),
Perloff and Salop (1985), and Anderson and Palma (1992), make predictions in line with
the commonly held belief that the equilibrium price decreases with a new entry; the former
and the latter in models of spatial competition, and Perloff and Salop (1985) in a model of
non-localized competition, when preferences are bounded.
Theory, therefore, fails to provide a unique effect of deregulating entry on equilibrium
prices. Empirical contributions in this area are of fundamental importance, therefore, to shed
light on the best way to regulate or deregulate a vast number of markets.
To conclude, the expected effect of lifting entry barriers is unclear according to theoretical
studies, while available empirical evidence indicates that such policies might have a different
impact to that expected. In the gasoline retail market, past studies have analyzed the effect on
gasoline retail prices of sales taxes, divorcement laws, sales-below-cost regulations and bans
on self-service stations. Nevertheless, the effect of removing entry barriers in this market
remains unexplored. This article seeks to fill this gap in the literature.
3 Background to the policy reform
In this section I present the context in which the policy reform took place and describe the
policy itself. As the current market configuration reflects its historical evolution, I start by
briefly describing the history of the Spanish gasoline market before discussing its current
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structure and the policy reform.
The Spanish gasoline retail market began its operations around 1930. From the outset
until 1984, it was fully controlled by the government via the public company CAMPSA.
During those years, private companies were only allowed to participate in refining and were
obliged to sell their gasoline to the public company. Gasoline stations were granted 75-year
concessions and were only allowed to buy their product from CAMPSA and to resell it at a
priced fixed by the government.
In seeking admission to the European Union (EU), Spain initiated the re-organization of
the sector in 1984. In the period from 1984 through 1992, known as the transition years toward
liberalization, a parallel network of gasoline stations was created selling imported products
from the EU. Crude oil imports were liberalized and barriers on the import of oil products
from other EU countries were reduced until they were finally lifted in 1992. A particular
milestone in this period was the founding of the public company REPSOL in 1987, to which
the government transferred all public oil and gas activities. In 1992, the oil monopoly was
lifted and modern retail gasoline market era began. Any distinction between the official and
parallel gasoline station networks was avoided, while CAMPSA was fully privatized, changing
its name to CLH and providing logistics and transportation activity. The privatization process
of REPSOL was also initiated and completed by 1997.
As expected, in common with most countries, Spains gasoline market entered its modern
era with one market leader, a legacy of the decades-long oil monopoly. The company occupy-
ing this spot was REPSOL, followed closely by CEPSA, a Spanish company that founded in
the early years of the countrys oil activity. A third firm that had operated for years in the
Spanish market was the British gasoline firm BP. Henceforth, I refer to these three as the
incumbents.
With the liberalization of the market in 1992, competition in the retail gasoline market was
not especially intense because of the asymmetries between competitors. As a result, several
liberalization and competition-oriented measures were introduced in the following years. In
the gasoline station network, prices were fully liberalized and unrestricted access to third
parties to the network was introduced in 1998, the year in which Spains Energy Regulator
was created. In 2000, daily price reporting from gasoline stations was made mandatory,
and restrictions on the opening of new gasoline stations were imposed at the provincial level
on companies with a larger than 30% market share and on those with a 15 to 30% share.
Similarly, large commercial areas were allowed to house a gasoline station. Finally, the last
measure prior to February 2013 was the removal of the minimum distance restrictions imposed
between stations in 2001.
As discussed in the introduction to this Section, both the initial configuration of the market
and the subsequent reforms have conditioned the evolution of the Spanish retail gasoline
market. Table 1 shows the market shares of the principal competitors in 1995 and over
the last three years, as well as the total number of stations they each operate. As can be
observed, and in contrast with other cases, the number of stations has experienced constant
growth over the last 20 years. Indeed, between 1995 and 2004 this growth is estimated at
about 70%. Among the incumbents, REPSOL decreased its participation by 22 points and
CEPSA by 10, while BP maintained its share throughout the period. In 1995, almost 80% of
gasoline stations were operated by one of the two major brands, but by 2014 they accounted
for only 47% of the supply. Hence, most of the growth in these years can be attributed to
unbranded gasoline stations and to the emergence of supermarket chains as a competitor in
the gasoline retail market.
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In short, before the policy reform examined in this study, the Spanish market had experi-
enced constant growth in the number of gasoline stations due, in the main, to new, unbranded
competitors. As Table 1 shows, this tendency was accentuated by the policy reform whose
impact on prices is the subject of this article.
Table 1: Spanish retail gasoline market. Share by brand and total number of stations. 1995;
2012-2014
Brand 1995 ... 2012 2013 2014
Repsol 55% 35% 34% 33%
Cepsa 24% 15 % 14 % 14%
BP 6 6 % 6 % 6 %
Galp 2% 6% 6 % 5%
Disa (Shell) 1.6% 5 % 5 % 5%
Other Wholesalers - 5% 5 % 6%
Supermarkets - 3 % 3 % 3%
Unbranded - 16 % 18 % 20%
Cooperatives - 6 % 6 % 5%
Total 6,327 10,424 10,617 10,712
Note: 1995 data from Cavero and Bello (2007); 2012-2014 data
from Spanish Association of Operators of Oil Products (AOP).
Deregulation of entry Against a backdrop of economic crisis and with an unemployment
rate of about 25%, on 22 February 2013, the Spanish Government enacted Royal Decree-
Law 4/2013 on ‘measures to support entrepreneurs and to stimulate growth and job creation’
and introduced normative reforms in different sectors of the economy. Among these reforms,
the law regulating the hydrocarbon sector (Law34/1998) was modified in several respects.
Specifically, two measures were introduced in the retail gasoline market: the first concerned
the deregulation of market entry, and, the second, vertical contract agreements.
In the case of market entry, the reform added a paragraph to the previous law establish-
ing that all land uses for commercial activities, malls, commercial parks, zones for vehicle
inspection, and, industrial zones were from that moment on also deemed compatible with the
use for gasoline stations. In this way, local governments obtained unrestricted entry to these
areas, despite previous urban planning laws that prevented local authorities from introducing
such measures.
As for the vertical agreements, the Decree-Law established a one-year contract duration,
renewable for a maximum period of three years. In addition, it banned the introduction of
clauses influencing or determining the retail price in future contracts in cases where the dealer
owned and operated the gasoline station.
4 The effect of free entry (deregulation) on gasoline equilib-
rium prices
4.1 Identification and Estimation Methods
The objective of the article is to identify the effect on equilibrium retail prices of deregulating
the entry of gasoline stations in industrial and commercial areas. Specifically, I seek to
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measure the average effect of entry on the prices charged by gasoline stations competing with
the entrant in specified areas. As my agents are gasoline stations, following Hastings (2004),
I consider all gasoline stations located in a one-mile radius of an industrial area. Ideally, I
should count on randomly selected deregulated areas and areas in which the restriction is
still effective, giving me a perfect counterfactual to measure the impact of deregulation on
price. However, the legislation was applied indiscriminately across the country and so I cannot
conduct a perfectly randomized experiment. I therefore identify the effect on the competitors
price of entry due to deregulation by estimating a counterfactual.
Although deregulation was introduced in both commercial and industrial areas, it only
had an entry effect in the case of the latter. This can be explained by the fact that since
2000 commercial areas had been able to open gasoline stations and so this regulation served
merely to further the previous reforms. This means that here I only consider industrial areas
with market entrants and industrial areas without any entrants following deregulation, and,
therefore, I have gasoline stations exposed to competition due to deregulation and stations
that have not suffered this same exposure.
An obvious concern here is that industrial areas with new market entrants may differ
in some respects from industrial areas without. For example, entry might have occurred in
areas with more intense industrial activity and with higher traffic. In this case, the lower
prices charged by competitors in these areas might be correlated with greater competition
and not only with the effect of a new market entrant in the newly deregulated area. To
tackle this potential problem, I first applied difference-in-difference methods to a longitudinal
data set of different stations (competitors in industrial areas and otherwise), eliminating
differences between areas and, hence, in the conditions of the two groups of gasoline stations
that are invariant over time. Additionally, in a second stage, I applied matching procedures
to control for different demand and supply drivers. In this way, I used the price changes of
stations located within a one-mile radius of industrial areas with no new entrants (control
group) to measure what would have happened to stations located within a one-mile radius
of industrial areas with new entrants (treated group), in the absence of deregulation. By
comparing changes in the outcomes of these two groups, I was able to control for observed
and unobserved time-invariant area characteristics that could affect retail prices of gasoline.
I estimated the following two-way fixed effect linear regression model:
pitj = βo + β1intt + β2Dit+ β3xi + β3xj + λm + λy + σj + εit (1)
where pitj is the logarithm of the monthly price of gasoline charged by gasoline station
i located in municipality j in period t; intt represents the international price of gasoline
in period t; Dit is a dummy variable that takes a value of one when gasoline station i is a
competitor of a new entrant in a deregulated area in period t; xi is a vector of control variables
that vary by gasoline station; xj is a vector of control variables that vary by municipality and
time; λm represents month dummies and λy year dummies, σj is a municipality dummy; and,
εit is a gasoline station time-varying error and is assumed to be independently distributed.
The logarithmic specification of price improves the normalization of the dependent variable
and facilitates the interpretation of the policy dummy as a percentage.
Recall that in this case, Dit do not take the value of 1 for all treated observations after
February 2013. Instead, it depends on the dynamics of the entrance of gasoline stations
throughout the post-deregulation period. Hence, Dit takes a value of 1 after gasoline station
i is exposed to an entrant from period t and onwards.
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Besides controlling for seasonality with the month dummy λm and for common shocks on
a yearly basis λy, especially relevant in the context of a crisis, I also include the international
price intt and specific gasoline station characteristics xi as control variables. The variable
intt is used as a proxy of the wholesale price that gasoline stations have to pay, controlling
for specific time shocks of the principal determinant of gasoline prices (Chouinard and Perloff
2007). The vector of controls of specific gasoline station characteristics, xi, incorporates a
group of dummy variables indicating the brand, if during the period there is a change in
brand, the presence of a coffee shop, store and carwash, whether the gasoline station is open
24 hours, and, location in an urban or industrial area, or on a main road or highway; and, a
group of index variables including the number of pumps and number of competitors within a
one-mile radius. Non-variant time variables are only included in specifications without fixed
effects.
Finally, I control for municipality characteristics that vary across time and that are related
to the size of the market for each gasoline station. Following previous articles, I include
population; number of cars, trucks and motorbikes; and, gross family income per capita (Vita
2000; Skidmore et al. 2005).
The estimate of interest in the model, β2, represents the difference-in-difference effect of
deregulation of entry on retail gasoline equilibrium prices. The key identifying assumption
for this approach is that the change in the prices of competitors in areas without entry is an
unbiased estimate of the prices that the treated gasoline stations would have charged in the
absence of entry (Meyer 1995). As this assumption is not observable, I provide evidence that it
holds by testing the existence of parallel trends between the two groups before entry. I do this
in two ways. First, I perform a mean test by period and the results show that I cannot reject
the equality in means between groups prior to February 2013 (see Figure 1). Second, I test for
equality between average changes in line with Galiani et al. (2005). The approach involves
estimating the transformed version of equation 1 so as to consider the control observations
over the entire period and the treated observations in the pre-treatment period. The policy
variable is replaced in this equation by dummies variables for each group and period. Finally,
the equality of the estimators for the control and treated groups is tested. The results of the
test indicate that I cannot reject the hypothesis of parallel trends. Estimation results and
tests are presented in Appendix A.
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Figure 1: Mean difference by period. Treated and control groups
Notes. The dot line divides periods in pre and post reform. The null
hypothesis of equality of means between control and treated groups can-
not be rejected for every period before deregulation. After deregulation
the alternative hypothesis is accepted.
Finally, an error correlation is expected both temporally and at the cross-section level
introducing a bias in the results. In such cases, as Bertrand et al. (2004) show, considering
an autocorrelated structure of the error term of degree 1 might not be enough to overcome the
problem. Hence, following the results of these authors, and given the large number of gasoline
stations in this study, I allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance structure by computing the
standard errors in clusters by id. I also test the robustness of the results by applying block
bootstrap to these id clusters.
4.2 The data
I assess the impact of entry deregulation on gasoline retail prices in Spain by drawing on
data from the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona. My data set contains information related to
gasoline stations in 168 municipalities of the Barcelona province. Within this geographical
area, the Catalan Government has defined 731 industrial areas. Maps of the municipalities
and the industrial areas were downloaded from the Department of Territory and Sustainability
of the Regional Government. A map of the area is presented in Appendix B.
Daily gasoline station prices were downloaded from the Ministry of Energys internet page,
where it provides price information for geo-referenced gasoline stations on a daily basis for
the whole of Spain. No historical data are stored on the site so prices had to be downloaded
daily to create the data set. The files from the Ministry contain geo-references (latitude
and longitude), the name of the gasoline station and the price charged. Gasoline stations
within the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona were identified by combining the geo-references
provided by the Ministry with the Regional Governments map of the area. This identification
procedure was performed in Matlab.
Having identified the Metropolitan Areas gasoline station, I combined their geo-references
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with the maps for the whole area and the map identifying the designated industrial areas,
in shape-file format, in the free, open-source geographic information system QGIS. Here, I
delimited the one-mile radius influence zones around the industrial areas for both treated and
control groups. Examples of treated and control groups are presented in Appendix B.
The dependent variable in my analysis is the monthly average price of diesel charged by
each gasoline station. Although data are available for all types of gasoline, I focus solely on
diesel as it represents approximately 70% of the Spanish market. Following the literature, I
use the net price in order to omit any tax distortions. Nevertheless, I checked the robustness
of my results when using both gross price and margin. I exclude gasoline stations that are
located both within a one-mile radius of an industrial area with entry and within another
without entry, and which therefore would have to be included in the treated and control
groups. Likewise, I exclude from the sample all gasoline stations that closed before the
deregulation was introduced in February 2013 and gasoline stations that entered the market
after that date. Finally, I do not include the competitors of gasoline stations that entered
an industrial area after July 2014 for two reasons: first, because of the small number of
observations that would in fact be included after deregulation (in most of the cases, 1 or 2);
and, second, because it would mean including locations with lower prices for the entire period
and give rise to problems of self-selection in the sample.
I use monthly data to make this series compatible with the international price of diesel,
which I use as proxy of the wholesale price. Overall, I have data for 322 gasoline stations.
Of these, 94 belong to the treated group and 228 to the control group. The period under
analysis extends over a 22-month period before and after the reform was introduced. As I
lack data for August 2011, my pre-reform period extends from March 2011 to January 2013,
while the post -reform period extends from March 2013 to December 2014. Hence, my sample
comprises an unbalanced panel of 14,168 observations.
The international price of diesel was downloaded from Spains Antitrust Institution (CNMC).
It corresponds to a weighted average that includes 70% of the Mediterranean Price and 30%
of the North Western European (new) price.
Data at the municipal level were downloaded from the Barcelona Provincial Councils web-
site. This includes the following variables: population, number of cars, trucks and motorbikes,
and, gross family income per capita. All variables are presented on an annual basis.
As discussed above, the vector of controls of specific gasoline station characteristics in-
cludes a group of dummy variables indicating the presence of a coffee shop, store and carwash,
whether the gasoline station is open 24 hours, location in an urban or industrial area, or on
a main road or highway, and, if the gasoline station changed brand during the period of the
analysis. In addition to these variables, I control for the number of pumps and brand. The
data was built using Google Earth and the oil companies websites, except for the brand and
change of brand variables, that were taken from the Ministry’s files. The table below presents
the characteristics of the gasoline stations in the treated and control groups in January 2013,
prior to the reform.
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Table 2: Gasoline stations characteristics. Mean differences in February 2013
Variable Treated Control Diff
Store 0.901 0.858 -0.043
(0.031) (0.024) (0.042)
Coffee shop 0.217 0.328 0.111
(0.043) (0.033) (0.057)
Carwash 0.505 0.545 0.039
(0.053) (0.035) (0.063)
Pumps 6.155 6.388 0.233
(0.236) (0.183) (0.315)
24 hs 0.452 0.454 0.002
(0.052) (0.033) (0.061)
Highway 0.042 0.035 -0.007
(0.021) (0.012) (0.023)
Urban 0.202 0.241 0.039
(0.041) (0.028) (0.052)
Industrial area 0.606 0.417 -0.189**
(0.051) (0.032) (0.060)
Main road 0.149 0.311 0.162**
(0.037) (0.031) (0.053)
CEPSA 0.106 0.114 0.008
(0.032) (0.021) (0.039)
Repsol 0.245 0.281 0.036
(0.044) (0.029) (0.054)
Particular 0.191 0.232 0.040
(0.040) (0.028) (0.051)
Competitors 6.563 4.172 -2.392***
(0.410) (0.287) (0.518)
Cars 82791 70234 -12556
(14768) (10243) (18560)
Trucks 15398 12916 -2482
(2574) (1790) (3241)
Motorbikes 23462 22382 -1080
(5878) (4015) (7305)
Notes. H0: Equality of means between groups. Statistical sig-
nificance at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*).
As is evident in this table, the two groups are largely similar and differ in very few
characteristics: namely, the percentage of gasoline stations located in industrial areas and on
main roads, and, the number of competitors to which the average gasoline stations belonging
to the treated and control groups are exposed. All the estimations control for these differences
in characteristics and so they do not interfere in the identification of the effect of deregulation
on price.
4.3 Results
In this section I address a number of econometric questions and discuss the results of the
estimations. First, the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test of the null hypothesis of con-
stant variance indicated that there might be a problem of heteroscedasticity. Second, the
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data showed that we might have a problem of
serial autocorrelation. However, eventually, the correlation between variables proved not to
be a concern for most of the variables following an analysis of the correlations and variance
inflation factors (VIF), with the exception of the factors expressing demand which are de-
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tailed and discussed below. The correlation matrix between variables and the corresponding
VIF are presented in Appendix C.
Estimation results of equation 1 are presented in Table 3. Column (1) reports estimates
of the fixed effects estimation allowing for an arbitrary variance-covariance structure with
standard errors clustered by id. This estimation not only allows me to control for unobserv-
able factors influencing price evolution but also for those differences between stations and
municipalities that do not vary over time. Recall that with this technique I also control for
gasoline station characteristics and location, given that all these features are time invariant.
Moreover, I avoid any estimation bias caused by correlation between the error term, as the
estimation was performed with clustered standard errors by id (Bertrand et al. 2004).
The results show that the deregulation of entry has led to a lower equilibrium price of
diesel. Competitors exposed to a new market entrant in an industrial area charge on average
1.70% per liter less than competitors not exposed to a new entrant. This result is economically
significant as it represents one fifth of the average retail margin of gasoline stations. Moreover,
a reduction of around 0.0122 euros per liter represents a saving for the whole of Spain of more
than 254 million euros on diesel expenditure per year1.
All the estimation results for the control variables work as expected. The coefficients for
the time variant variables are also reported in also in Table 3. Variations in the interna-
tional price are translated more than proportionally into the gasoline price. The number of
competitors is also significant in explaining differentials: the equilibrium price falls with an
additional competitor as the competition to attract consumers becomes more intensive. As
for the factors expressing demand, the results are shown only for population and income per
capita. The numbers of cars, motorbikes and trucks were excluded from the specification for
two reasons: first, these variables were highly correlated with population, showing a VIF of
4189, 2636 and 237, respectively, and their estimated coefficients were unreliable; and, second,
while I had population data for the whole period, data for these series from 2014 were missing.
The results for population and income were significant and presented the expected sign, that
is, an increase in the number of consumers means a reduction in the equilibrium price (market
expansion effect) and wealthier areas are subject to higher retail gasoline prices.
Column (2) presents the results for the fixed effect estimation when considering only the
competitors of unbranded entrants. As can be observed, the number of branded retailers that
entered the market during the period was very low (2), so much so that this sub-sample differed
from the original by just 10 gasoline stations. The results show that when an unbranded
station enters the market, the price reduction is slightly higher. Indeed, according to the
estimations, industrial areas with an unbranded entrant experience a reduction of 1.77% in
price in comparison to the prices charged in areas without an entrant. This result provides
support for previous evidence presented in Se05: an increase in the participation of unbranded
retailers implies greater reductions in equilibrium price.
Finally, Column (3) reports the estimation results when considering only those gasoline
stations exposed to one entrant. In this instance, the number of gasoline stations in the
treated group falls from 90 to 54, given that 36 gasoline stations in the sample are subject
to competition from more than one entrant. The results show that in those areas where
just one entry was recorded following deregulation, the reduction in equilibrium price of the
competitors was on average 1.39%. This indicates that the impact of the first entrant on the
competitors price is greater than the impact of subsequent entrants; however it also show
1Considering a consumption of 20,910,000 tons at country level for the year 2013 as reported by AOP
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that the decrease in price is intensified by the following entries.
Table 3: Estimation results
Variable All sample Only unbranded One entrant
D(DiD) -0.0170*** -0.0176*** -0.0139***
(-0.0044) (-0.0046) (-0.0057)
Int 1.034*** 1.035*** 1.036***
(-0.009) (-0.009) (-0.01)
Competitors -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.005***
(-0.002) (-0.002) (-0.002)
Population -3.23 e−07* -3.33 e−07* -3.73 e−07*
(-1.84 e−07) (-1.82 e−07) (-1.80 e−07)
Income 2.19 e−05* 2.02 e−05* 2.003e−05*
(-1.16 e−05) (-1.16 e−05) (-1.21 e−05)
Constant -1.244*** -1.226*** -1.225***
(-0.173) ( -0.174) ( -0.183)
Brand dummies X X X
Titularity change X X X
Month dummies X X X
Year dummies X X X
R2 0.847 0.845 0.844
Joint significance test 2387.12*** 2209.79*** 1979.89***




Observations 13,755 13,315 12,009
Ids 322 312 282
Notes. Fixed effects estimation, clustered standard errors by id. Statistical significance
at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). Wooldridge test H0: No first − order autocorrelation;
Breusch − Pagan /Cook − Weisberg test H0: Constant variance.
Table 4 explores the dynamic effect of the policy. Using the same controls as in the previous
specifications and a fixed effect estimation with clustered standard errors by id, I estimate
the effect on the equilibrium price of entry in the first six months following deregulation
(March-August 2013), in the following six-month period (September 2013-February 2014),
in the six-month period one year after deregulation (March-August 2014), and, during the
last four months of the sample study (September-December 2014). The results show that
the effect of the policy decreases over time. The average reduction in price during the first
six months following deregulation was about 3.39%, while one year later, the reduction is
estimated to be less than half that value, standing at about 1.45%.
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Table 4: Dynamic effect of the reform









Notes. Fixed effects estimation, clustered standard errors by id. Statistical significance
at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*).
4.4 Robustness Checks
I adopt various strategies to check the robustness of my results.
First, I check the robustness of the results respect to the estimation methods. Table 5
shows, in columns (1) and (2), a pooled estimation of equation 1 and a fixed effects estimation
with block bootstrap by id. For the pooled estimation a panel specific AR-1 autocorrelation
structure and panel-level heteroscedastic error were assumed. Although this estimation is
likely to give worse outcomes than the others due to a different structure of autocorrelation
in the error term, it allows me to include control variables that might influence the price
but which are invariant or vary very little over time, such as gasoline station characteristics
and their location, and to check the significance of the estimators. The number of gasoline
stations is lower in this estimation, because the characteristics of some gasoline stations are
missing due to a lack of information. As observed, the results hold for both specifications,
though the reduction in price due to deregulation for the pooled estimation is a little lower
(c. 1.59%). This result might differ with respect to the other two estimations because the
autocorrelation treatment is different and because of the lower number of observations in the
pooled estimation.
Second, I test the robustness of the results with respect to the price measure used.
Columns (3) and (4) present the results for the logarithm of gross price and margin. As
expected, the percentage reduction in price is lower when using the gross price, though the
results hold. The results of the price margin confirm that the effect of deregulation is to
reduce retailer margins by around a fifth.
Third, I run a placebo test to check that the effect is only found when entry takes place.
The placebo involves dropping all treated observations and assigning treatment randomly to
controls. Then I re-estimate equation 1. In total, I have 87 new treated stations and 141
controls. As can be observed in Column (5), the variable of interest is not significant when
the experiment is run with the control observations.
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Table 5: Robustness checks
Variable Pooled (1) Bootstrap (2) Gross Price (3) Margin (4) Placebo (5)
D (DiD) -0.0159*** -0.0170*** -0.0138*** -0.185*** 0.0025
(-0.0028) (-0.0046) (-0.0028) (-0.0617) (-0.0033)
Controls X X X X X
Titularity change X X X X X
Brand dummies X X X X X
Month dummies X X X X X
Year dummies X X X X X
R2 0.93 0.847 0.823 0.292 0.846
Observations 11,513 13,755 13,764 12,330 9,692
Ids 268 322 322 322 228
Notes. (1) Praise-Winsten corrected standard errors for AR-1 autocorrelation structure and panel-
level heteroscedastic errors; (2)Fixed effects, block bootstrap by id. (3-5) Fixed effects estimation,
standard errors clustered by id. Statistical significance at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*).
Finally, I check the robustness of the results with respect to the heterogeneous response
of the control and treated groups to pre-existent differences. Here, the first concern might be
that treated and control groups differ in pre-existent characteristics that might bias results.
As reported in the data section, stations in the two groups differ in terms of the percentage
of gasoline stations located in industrial areas and on main roads, and with respect to the
number of competitors that each gasoline station has within a one-mile radius distance.
The second concern might be that there exist differences in preexistent characteristics
conditioning price evolution between areas with entry and areas without entry. Specifically,
areas with new entrants might differ in terms of their demand and supply factors and this,
rather than deregulation, might account for differences in price evolution.
To overcome these concerns, I first perform matching procedures and estimate equation 1
with the observations that have common support. Matching procedures eliminate the poten-
tial bias by pairing gasoline stations subject to entry (treated group) with gasoline stations
without entry (control group) with similar characteristics and exposed to the same level of de-
mand and competition prior to deregulation. Hence, following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983),
in a first step I estimate the probability of being treated conditional on the pretreatment
characteristics of the gasoline stations and demand of the area (z) and match treated and
control gasoline stations regarding this estimated probability, known as the propensity score.
This is Pr(z)= Pr( D = 1|z).
I estimate the propensity score for each gasoline station using a logit regression with two
different specifications. First, I estimate the propensity score conditional on the characteristics
of gasoline stations that differed in the treated and control groups. The form of the estimation
is the following:
P (Di = 1|z) = α+ β0Z + εi (2)
where Z is a vector representing all the characteristics of the gasoline stations in the
treated and control groups that present different means, that is, location in an industrial
area, location on a main road, and, number of competitors.
The second specification I estimate calculates the probability of being treated conditional
on the pre-existent level of demand of the areas in which the gasoline stations are located
and the number of competitors. Specification 2 follows the same form as Specification 1, but
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in this case Z is a vector representing level of demand and number of competitors to which
gasoline station i is exposed, including the number of cars, trucks and motorbikes for 2012
and the number of competitors of gasoline station i. In this specification I did not include the
variables of location in an industrial area and on a main road, since according to Specification
1 they are not relevant for explaining the treatment. Finally, unlike the previous estimations,
I included the number of cars, trucks and motorbikes instead of population. As I undertake
a cross-sectional estimation, these disaggregated variables represent demand more accurately
than population for the year 2012.
Having obtained the propensity score for both specifications, in each case I then matched
the observations using the first-nearest neighbor algorithm; in other words, for every treated
observation on common support the algorithm looks for the control observation with the
closest propensity score. After matching each treated observation with its closest control, I
dropped all remaining observations.
After this matching process, I was able to eliminate the potential bias due to differences
in the characteristics between gasoline stations as well as that due to differences in demand
and the number of competitors. The results for the logistic regressions and mean differences
test between groups are presented in Appendix D.
In addition, I adopted a second strategy to check the robustness of results regarding the
heterogeneous response to pre-existing differences between the treated and control groups.
This strategy involved keeping the treated gasoline stations during a shorter period of time.
Hence, in this sub-sample I only have competitors near industrial areas where entry took
place after deregulation. For this reason, I would expect the areas to be similar with regard
to demand drivers and market concentration.
For this sub-sample, the treated and control groups were constructed as follows. I clas-
sified gasoline stations according to the period in which entry occurred. I retained as my
treated group all the competitors exposed to a market entrant in the first eight months after
deregulation, and, I built my counterfactual with all the gasoline stations that were not ex-
posed to an entrant in those first eight months, but which were exposed to an entry in the
following eight-month period. In total, I have 42 treated and 36 control units for a period of
time of eight months pre- and post-deregulation. The pre-deregulation period extends from
June 2012 to January 2013, and the post-deregulation period from March to October 2013.
Monthly dummies were included to control for seasonality. Overall, the sub-sample comprises
1,248 observations.
The results for both strategies are presented in Table 6. Column (1) reports estimates for
Specification 1 of the matching strategy, Column (2) presents the results for Specification 2,
and Column (3) for the restricted sample strategy.
As can be seen, the results are robust to every specification. The effect of deregulating the
market is a reduction in the gasoline retail equilibrium price, even after controlling for hetero-
geneous responses due to differences in gasoline station characteristics, demand across areas
and the number of competitors across gasoline stations. The matching procedure samples
report a decrease in the equilibrium price due to deregulation of 1.24% and 1.14%, depend-
ing on the specification, while the restricted sample strategy estimates a 2.84% decrease in
price. The differences between the strategies are attributable to the differences in the period
of time analyzed for each strategy. While the matching samples cover the 22 months pre-
and post-reform, the restricted sample only analyzes differences in the price evolution of the
treated and control groups during the first 8 months pre- and post-reform. Recall that Table
4 shows that the effect of the reform is decreasing over time.
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Table 6: Robustness checks. Matching and restricted sample estimation results
Matching Restricted
Variable (1) (2) (3)
D (DiD) -0.0124** -0.0114** -0.0284***
(-0.0048) (-0.0047) (-0.00745)
Controls X X X
Brand dummies X X X
Month dummies X X X
Year dummies X X X
R2 0.838 0.848 0.821
Joint significance test 1289*** 1445*** 262.43***




Observations 7,664 7,977 1,239
Ids 180 188 78
Notes. (1) and (2) samples selected by matching procedures; Specifications 1
and 2, respectively. Restricted: restricted sample using only 8 months before
and after deregulation. All results are from a fixed effects estimation with
standard errors clustered by id. Statistical significance at 1% (***), 5% (**)
and 10% (*). Wooldridge test H0: No first − order autocorrelation; Breusch
− Pagan /Cook − Weisberg test H0: Constant variance.
5 Conclusions
In this article I have estimated the effect of entry restrictions on retail gasoline equilibrium
prices by exploiting a quasi-experimental environment created by a change in Spanish regu-
lations. In February 2013, a Central Government reform allowed gasoline stations to operate
in industrial and commercial areas. This deregulation led to a high number of new market
entrants over the following two years in these newly designated industrail ‘free entry’ areas.
I have adopted a difference-in-difference approach, applied to a geo-referenced database,
to assess the effect of deregulation on the equilibrium price. I also provide evidence of the
robustness of the results reported by implementing several estimation techniques, with dif-
ferent price measures and performing a placebo test. The results show that prices fell by
about 1.7% as a result of the deregulation of entry. This represents a saving of more than
254 million euros in annual expenditure on diesel alone.
Moreover, these results hold when controlling for heterogeneous responses due to pre-
existent differences in gasoline stations between groups and between areas. By applying
matching procedures, I report that gasoline retail prices were at least 1.2% lower for gasoline
stations exposed to entry than for those not exposed to new entrants following deregulation.
In a second strategy, in which I compared only treated stations with future treated stations
during a shorter period of time, I obtained a price decrease due to deregulation of around
2.84%. However, the difference between the samples is attributable to differences in the time
period analyzed, since the impact of the reform proved to be higher in the first few months
and to be decreasing in time thereafter.
The results show that the marginal impact on price attributable to entry falls with the
number of entrants. In other words, the first entrant causes a greater impact than subsequent
market entrants, and that this same dynamic is associated with the impact of the reform over
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time. In the first six months following deregulation, gasoline stations exposed to a new entrant
charge on average 3.4% less than their matched pair not subject to exposure. However, one
year later the effect had been almost halved, with the price charged being just 1.45% less.
The results reported here are also very much in line with those found in Sen (2005), that
is, the impact on prices is higher when the entrant is an unbranded station.
Additionally, and as expected, my empirical results are consistent with modeling the
demand for gasoline as a discrete choice model using the logit, in line with Houde (2012). As
shown by Anderson and Palma (1992), when modelling demand with the logit, a new market
entry leads to a decrease in the average retail price. In this sense, I can rule out the existence
of significant search costs in the gasoline retail market and a strong consumer preference
for a particular gasoline station or brand. Although there is a differentiation of product
geographically, the difference between stations is not great enough for gasoline stations to
behave as monopolies.
The results presented here are, I believe, not only of interest for gasoline retail markets,
but they should also be particularly informative for public policy makers concerned with other
sectors that still operate restrictions on market entry. In particular, the results should be of
fundamental importance to the grocery sector which continues to be characterized by a highly
regulated access, given its impact on family expenditure.
Finally, as discussed, market entry following deregulation has been primarily of unbranded
retailers. As such, I expect regulation has not only affected equilibrium prices but also market
structure. Therefore, future lines of research could usefully assess the effect of market entry
regulations on the structure of the gasoline retail market and on social welfare.
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Appendix A Parallel trends identifying assumption
Table A.1: Parallel trends test. Estimation results. Part 1.
Variable Coef. Robust St. Err. z P>| z |
treated march 2011 0.118 0.0035 33.46 0.000
control march 2011 0.118 0.0026 45.31 0.000
treated april 2011 0.126 0.0035 36.20 0.000
control april 2011 0.126 0.0026 48.47 0.000
treated may 2011 0.091 0.0035 26.33 0.000
control may 2011 0.090 0.0026 34.89 0.000
treated june 2011 0.095 0.0035 27.40 0.000
control june 2011 0.093 0.0026 36.30 0.000
treated july 2011 0.095 0.0035 27.56 0.000
control july 2011 0.093 0.0025 36.60 0.000
treated september 2011 0.108 0.0035 31.35 0.000
control september 2011 0.106 0.0025 41.82 0.000
treated october 2011 0.112 0.0035 32.43 0.000
control october 2011 0.109 0.0025 42.93 0.000
treated november 2011 0.133 0.0034 38.62 0.000
control november 2011 0.129 0.0025 51.23 0.000
treated december 2011 0.122 0.0034 35.39 0.000
control december 2011 0.119 0.0025 47.13 0.000
treated january 2012 0.149 0.0034 43.23 0.000
control january 2012 0.119 0.0025 47.13 0.000
treated february 2012 0.156 0.0034 45.25 0.000
control february 2012 0.151 0.0025 60.12 0.000
treated march 2012 0.176 0.0034 51.13 0.000
control march 2012 0.167 0.0025 66.50 0.000
treated april 2012 0.188 0.0034 54.80 0.000
control april 2012 0.183 0.0025 72.84 0.000
treated may 2012 0.169 0.0034 49.15 0.000
control may 2012 0.164 0.0025 65.23 0.000
treated june 2012 0.128 0.0034 37.57 0.000
control june 2012 0.124 0.0025 49.09 0.000
treated july 2012 0.157 0.0034 46.02 0.000
control july 2012 0.152 0.0025 60.38 0.000
treated august 2012 0.209 0.0034 61.18 0.000
control august 2012 0.206 0.0025 81.66 0.000
Notes: All control variables included. Praise-Winsten corrected standard errors
for AR-1 autocorrelation structure and panel-level heteroscedastic errors.
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Table A.2: Parallel trends test. Estimation results. Part 2.
Variable Coef. Robust St. Err. z P>| z |
treated september 2012 0.223 0.0034 65.42 0.000
control september 2012 0.22 0.0025 86.83 0.000
treated october 2012 0.21 0.0034 62.64 0.000
control october 2012 0.21 0.0025 82.48 0.000
treated november 2012 0.179 0.0034 52.09 0.000
control november 2012 0.174 0.0026 68.09 0.000
treated december 2012 0.166 0.0034 48.26 0.000
control december 2012 0.162 0.0026 62.89 0.000
treated january 2013 0.181 0.0035 52.37 0.000
control january 2013 0.178 0.0026 69.45 0.000
treated march 2013 0.179 0.0035 51.48 0.000
control march 2013 0.179 0.0026 69.62 0.000
treated april 2013 0.146 0.0036 40.65 0.000
control april 2013 0.146 0.0026 56.49 0.000
treated may 2013 0.138 0.0037 37.78 0.000
control may 2013 0.135 0.0026 52.51 0.000
treated june 2013 0.140 0.0038 36.43 0.000
control june 2013 0.133 0.0025 52.59 0.000
treated july 2013 0.161 0.004 39.98 0.000
control july 2013 0.158 0.0025 64.48 0.000
treated august 2013 0.163 0.004 39.78 0.000
control august 2013 0.162 0.0024 66.70 0.000
treated september 2013 0.180 0.004 44.99 0.000
control september 2013 0.180 0.0024 74.86 0.000
treated october 2013 0.158 0.0043 37.10 0.000
control october 2013 0.160 0.0024 67.21 0.000
treated november 2013 0.143 0.0064 22.32 0.000
control november 2013 0.146 0.0024 61.58 0.000
treated december 2013 0.143 0.008 18.30 0.000
control december 2013 0.153 0.0024 65.07 0.000
treated january 2014 0.137 0.0088 15.60 0.000
control january 2014 0.144 0.0023 61.65 0.000
treated february 2014 0.140 0.0097 14.32 0.000
control february 2014 0.143 0.0023 61.85 0.000
treated march 2014 0.128 0.0103 12.46 0.000
control march 2014 0.133 0.0023 58.46 0.000
treated april 2014 0.130 0.0121 10.74 0.000
control april 2014 0.131 0.0022 59.07 0.000
treated may 2014 0.129 0.0131 9.83 0.000
control may 2014 0.207 0.0032 64.16 0.000
Notes: All control variables included. Praise-Winsten corrected
standard errors for AR-1 autocorrelation structure and panel-level
heteroscedastic errors. R2 = 0.9456.
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Table A.3: Hypothesis test: H0 : treatedt − controlt = 0
Variable chi2 Prob > chi2 H0 vs. Ha
march 2011 0.00 0.9679 H0
april 2011 0.00 0.9922 H0
may 2011 0.11 0.7444 H0
june 2011 0.30 0.5838 H0
july 2011 0.42 0.5167 H0
september 2011 0.49 0.4840 H0
october 2011 1.02 0.3123 H0
november 2011 1.29 0.2554 H0
december 2011 0.77 0.3790 H0
january 2012 1.29 0.2553 H0
february 2012 1.59 0.2076 H0
march 2012 6.41 0.0114 Ha
april 2012 2.25 0.1337 H0
may 2012 1.76 0.1851 H0
june 2012 2.07 0.1505 H0
july 2012 2.26 0.1330 H0
august 2012 0.70 0.4016 H0
september 2012 1.08 0.2995 H0
october 2012 1.58 0.2086 H0
november 2012 1.60 0.2057 H0
december 2012 1.25 0.2633 H0
january 2013 0.53 0.4685 H0
march 2013 0.00 0.9441 H0
april 2013 0.00 0.9846 H0
may 2013 0.93 0.3353 H0
june 2013 3.17 0.0752 H0
july 2013 0.39 0.5304 Ha
august 2013 0.15 0.7021 H0
september 2013 0.00 0.9449 H0
october 2013 0.33 0.5643 H0
november 2013 0.27 0.6059 H0
december 2013 1.67 0.1960 H0
january 2014 0.57 0.4508 H0
february 2014 0.12 0.7307 H0
march 2014 0.22 0.6373 H0
april 2014 0.01 0.9338 H0
may 2014 0.03 0.8566 H0
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Appendix B The data
Figure B.1: Metropolitan Area of Barcelona
      Industrial areas 
      Petrol stations 
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Figure B.2: Industrial areas and treated and control groups construction
     Industrial areas with entry 
     Industrial areas without entry 
     One mile buffer 
     Petrol stations 
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Appendix C Correlation between variables
Table C.1: Correlation matrix
.
Variable lprice int store comp coffe road pop ind high wash 24 pumps D Y mbik car truck change
lprice 1
int 0.8543 1.0000
store 0.0878 0.0044 1.0000
comp -0.0950 -0.0224 -0.0547 1.0000
coffe 0.0529 0.0036 0.1719 -0.1491 1.0000
road 0.0615 -0.0005 0.1938 -0.3589 0.1231 1.0000
pop 0.0679 0.0042 -0.0692 0.3875 -0.0381 -0.1767 1.0000
ind -0.0954 -0.0003 -0.2113 0.3204 -0.1428 -0.5272 0.0771 1.0000
highway 0.0677 -0.0007 0.0848 -0.0532 0.1177 -0.1310 -0.0485 -0.2046 1.0000
wash 0.0224 0.0018 0.1932 -0.0546 0.0507 0.0745 -0.0295 0.0994 -0.1051 1.0000
24 hs 0.0226 -0.0031 0.1478 0.0331 -0.0215 -0.0459 0.0434 -0.1351 0.1788 0.0542 1.0000
pumps 0.0720 0.0042 0.2428 -0.0033 0.1260 0.0432 0.0382 -0.0527 0.2145 0.0357 0.1848 1.0000
D -0.3409 -0.2750 0.0067 0.2284 -0.0501 -0.0843 -0.0296 0.0980 -0.0156 0.0032 0.0065 -0.0494 1.0000
Y 0.0621 0.0006 -0.0105 0.0667 -0.0779 -0.0161 0.5723 -0.0673 -0.0104 0.0502 0.0519 -0.0013 -0.1158 1.0000
mbike 0.0743 0.0029 -0.0690 0.3209 -0.0241 -0.1472 0.9941 0.0622 -0.0543 -0.0236 0.0365 0.0378 -0.0443 0.5981 1.0000
cars 0.0677 0.0065 -0.0714 0.3963 -0.0386 -0.1808 0.9990 0.0833 -0.0503 -0.0266 0.0422 0.0369 -0.0254 0.5614 0.9911 1.0000
trucks 0.0659 0.0081 -0.0719 0.4132 -0.0404 -0.1857 0.9970 0.0884 -0.0504 -0.0280 0.0390 0.0367 -0.0217 0.5481 0.9860 0.9992 1.0000
change -0.0735 -0.0734 0.0158 -0.0876 -0.002 0.0333 -0.0498 0.0454 -0.027 0.0188 0.0906 -0.0686 -0.0373 -0.049 -0.0418 -0.0515 -0.0532
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Table C.2: Variance Inflation Factor
Variable lprice road pop Y mbik car truck
lprice − − − − − − −
int 1 − − − − − −
road − − − − − − −
pop − − − − − − −
ind − 1 − − − − −
Y − − 1.92 − − − −
mbik − − 240.94 − 237.44 770.07 770.07
car − − 4218.70 4189.41 43.64 − 43.64
truck − − 2678.02 2636.80 69.34 69.34 −
Note: Tolerance rule V IF < 10
Appendix D Robustness checks
Table D.1: Logistic regression. Probability of having an entrant after deregulation
Specification 1 Specification 2
Variable Coeff. Std. Dev. z P > |z| Coeff. Std. Dev. z P > |z|
Industrial area 0.36 0.30 1.19 0.234 − − − −
Main road -0.034 0.39 -0.87 0.38 − − − −
Competitors 0.105 0.030 3.47 0.001 0.994 0.39 2.52 0.12
Trucks − − − − -0.0005 0.0002 -2.34 0.019
Motorbikes − − − − -0.0001 0.00004 -2.93 0.003
Cars − − − − 0.0001 0.00005 2.57 0.010
Note: All dependent variables correspond to year 2012, before deregulation.
Table D.2: Matching samples. Mean differences in February 2013
Specification 1 Specification 2
Variable Treated Control Diff
Industrial area 0.606 0.417 -0.189 0.61 0.5 -0.11
(0.051) (0.032) (0.060) (0.052) (0.053) 0.074
Main road 0.149 0.128 -0.021 0.156 0.189 0.033
(0.037) (0.035) (0.051) (0.038) (0.041) (0.056)
Competitors 6.564 7.276 0.713 6.2 7.03 0.83
(0.410) (0.467) (0.622) (0.38) (0.52) (0.64)
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